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Living on the edge: welfare and the urban poor in 1930s 
Beijing
Marjorie Dryburgh 
University of Sheffield
In February 1935, police clerk Shu Zhongsan applied to the Beijing city government’s Social 
Affairs Bureau for the release of Wang Peilin, aged seventeen, from the Women’s Welfare 
Institute. The daughter of a close friend, described by Shu as a ‘sworn brother’, Ms Wang 
had entered the Institute five years earlier after her parents left the city to find work. They 
had not returned, but it had never, Shu declared, been intended that she should stay there 
permanently. Peilin was now an adult, he had found an opportunity for her to learn a trade, 
and it would be a great kindness on the part of the authorities to allow her to leave.1 The 
application was approved. Ms Wang’s case underlines features of urban poverty that recur 
across the archives of the time. Poverty divided families as it forced parents to move in 
search of a living. Poverty might be survived or mitigated by the exploitation of family or 
individual social capital. The city authorities accepted some obligation to offer support to the 
1Beijing Municipal archive, Social affairs Bureau (hereafter, BMa/SaB) J002-007-01286, 1935.
ABSTRACT
This article examines poverty and welfare provision in early 
twentieth-century Beijing as dialogue and transaction between the 
city government and the urban poor. Earlier studies of the Chinese 
urban have tended to emphasize the material aspects of urban 
development, and the efforts of planners and city governments to 
modernize China’s cities, rather than the human experience of the city. 
This article draws on the extensive archives of the Beijing Municipal 
Government Social Affairs Bureau to extend our understanding of 
the experience of poverty and the agency of the poor. The archive 
confirms that Beijing’s growing and increasingly formalized welfare 
institutions were designed to discipline the poor as they alleviated 
poverty. However, the correspondence between applicants for 
welfare and the Social Affairs Bureau also reveals that the poor 
often approached these institutions instrumentally and assertively. 
Recourse to the welfare institute became a livelihood tactic, a claim on 
the authorities in pursuit of which certain sub-groups within the poor 
mobilized intangible assets, from social networks to understanding 
of the intended terms of the system, to sway the terms of their 
engagement with the authorities in their own favour.
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SoCiAl HiSToRy  15
poor, but the terms on which that support was given, and the relationships between those 
who received support, their families and the city authorities were subject to negotiation.
Poverty in urban China was not only widespread but also complex. Understandings 
of poverty and its meanings in national and social terms were changing rapidly and our 
understanding of the lives of the urban poor remains imperfect. The existing literature 
confirms that the urban poor were vulnerable in the face of economic insecurity and an 
official mind-set that privileged material modernization over popular welfare. Yet Wang 
Peilin’s case points to a more complex and more transactional relationship between the 
authorities and the poor than some studies suggest, shaped not only by official priorities, but 
also by the efforts of the poor to carve out a livelihood in the difficult economic conditions 
of inter-war China.
These transactions, in the decade before the outbreak of war with Japan in July 1937, 
are charted in the archives of the Beijing city government’s Social Affairs Bureau (SAB).2 
After the national capital was moved south to Nanjing in 1928, Beijing’s declining economy 
and a rise in the officially perceived importance of poverty and welfare work coincided 
with the development of a city administration that was better organized than its precursor, 
more ambitious in the scope of its work and – by the early 1930s – more meticulous in 
documenting its activities.3 The Bureau’s remit was wide – it was also responsible for religious 
affairs, the regulation of small traders and education – but the importance of welfare work 
is reflected in extensive (though not exhaustive) records of organizational matters and 
regulations for the municipal welfare institutes, staff appointments, salaries and, in some 
cases, extended lists of institute entrants, giving names, ages and places of origin.
These files also contain correspondence between city people and government, including 
applications for entry to and exit from the institutes, terse summaries by officials of the 
grounds on which applications were made and accepted, letters apparently written by 
literate applicants, and others written by third parties – friends, or professional scribes, 
or even clerks – on their behalf.4 A preliminary sampling of release applications for adult 
women pointed to an understanding of welfare that was framed by reference to individual 
entitlement and official obligation, as well as by regulations. Reading outwards across other 
categories of applicant for the most densely documented years (roughly 1932–7), we find 
this framework also in cases involving poor families and their children, beggars and addicts. 
This suggests that poor relief formed a contact zone in which official preoccupations at times 
worked in dialogue with the efforts of the poor to build personal and family livelihoods.
In the years examined below, the SAB worked to formalize, modernize and expand the 
welfare sector. Earlier charitable work in Beijing had primarily been the preserve of civic 
or religious associations, sometimes working in co-operation with the city government.5 
2 the city was known at this time variously as Beijing/Peking/Beiping/Peiping; for the sake of clarity, i have used the more 
familiar ‘Beijing’ throughout. the other substantial divisions of the city government were Finance, Public Health, Public Works 
and Police. Beiping Municipal Government, Beiping shi tongji lanyao [Essential Statistics on Beijing] (Beijing, 1936), 21.
3 the Beijing Municipal archive catalogues show only a handful of files referring to welfare from before 1928. available online at: 
http://www.bjma.org.cn/index.ycs (accessed 21 august 2015).
4 literacy rates were not high, but were hard to determine. See S. Gamble, How Chinese Families Live in Peiping (New york, 
1933), 167–9. the SaB files have not so far been much used by scholars, except in Zhao Ma’s analysis of women’s social 
networks, ‘Down the alleyway: courtyard tenements and women’s networks in early twentieth-century Beijing’, Journal of 
Urban History, 36, 2 (2010), 151–72, and (in combination with police files) in Janet chen’s study of disciplinary/punitive 
approaches to poverty and the poor, Guilty of Indigence: The Urban Poor in China, 1900–1953 (Princeton, 2012).
5 S. Naquin, Peking: Temples and City Life, 1400–1900 (Berkeley, 2000), 651–71; y. tong and F. Xi, ‘Minguo chunian (1916–
1918) Beijing de pinmin jiuji huodong – yi Chenzhongbao wei shijiao’ [‘Poor relief in Beijing in the early republic, from the 
perspective of the Morning Bell’], Dongbei daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban), 3 (2015), 102–7.
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16  M. DRyBuRGH 
By the 1920s, official control over welfare work was rising dramatically. Most of Beijing’s 
private charitable institutions – with the exception of the Xiangshan Orphanage, founded in 
1917 and seen as a model of welfare provision – were neither large nor well documented.6 In 
1928, when recorded, state-run provision of welfare across China was low, the SAB inherited 
three public welfare institutes (two for men, and one for women which also accommodated 
children, including boys below the age of ten), two training factories (again, one for men 
and one for women) and a beggars’ rehabilitation unit; most were located in the poorer areas 
of the inner city.7 In the 1930s, some of these units were reorganized, and some (notably 
the women’s welfare institute and women’s training factory) amalgamated to cut costs and 
pool staff expertise.8 By the mid-1930s, most Beijing institutes housed between 250 and 400 
inmates, though numbers fluctuated seasonally and turnover was high.9
‘The poor’ are here defined not by income or by occupational categories 
(‘rickshaw-puller’, ‘factory worker’, ‘beggar’). Instead, they fall into two groups of those 
admitted by the authorities to the welfare institutes (many of whom were orphans, 
vulnerable women, beggars or addicts), and those who applied for admission. The latter 
were a self-selecting sub-group of those who lived in poverty, characterized by their own 
judgement that their future survival depended on official support. It is hard to allocate 
them to conventional categories applied elsewhere – the ‘middling poor’, for example – as 
their stories reveal the ease with which one could slip from one category to another, from 
telephone operator or small butcher to recipient of municipal welfare. They include some of 
the working poor (typically small traders, low-level government employees, apprentices and 
servants), those among the unemployed who had previously worked in similar occupations, 
and their dependants. These were families on the very edge of economic security, rather 
than the utterly destitute, and their experience may therefore not reflect the full complexity, 
or many of the depths, of urban poverty in pre-war China.
The letters and petitions of these city people highlight a hitherto-neglected negotiation 
between government and people over the meanings of poverty and the status of the poor. 
As well as offering insights into the shocks and trends that affected Beijing livelihoods, their 
communications with the city authorities are inflected by their understandings of their own 
needs and eligibility for support. They reveal the flexibility shown by poorer families in their 
pursuit of economic security, and they sketch an implied contract between the poor and the 
city authorities. They point also to the assertive use of welfare by the poor as a livelihood 
strategy and not as a submission to the state project, and reveal that the state’s ambitions 
were subject to challenge, deflection and appropriation. They thereby reveal more of the 
texture of urban poverty, and a more dialogic relationship between local state and individual 
than earlier studies have suggested.
6 X. li and Q. Huo, ‘1927–1937 nian Jing-Jin diqu guojia zhengquan yu minjian cishan zuzhi de hudong guanxi’ [‘the interaction 
between state power and charitable organizations in Beijing and tianjin, 1927–1937’], Lanzhou xuekan, 4 (2011), 151–5; 
S. li and M. Wang, ‘ “Jiuji jiaoyu”: 1917–1937 nian Beijing xinxing fuyou cishan shiye de ge an fenxi’ [‘Education and welfare: 
analysis of new-style charitable work targeting women and children in Beijing, 1917–1937’], Shoudu shifan daxue xuebao 
(shehui kexue ban), 193 (2010), 130–2. christian missionary organizations appear only rarely in these files.
7 li and Wang, op. cit., 128. in 1930, 566 relatively prosperous counties (about one quarter of the total) across china had 
466 ‘new’ institutions (old people’s homes, orphanages and nurseries, training factories, homes for people with disabilities 
and credit-granting bodies), in addition to 1622 older charitable organizations. See X. Ke, Pinqiong Wenti [On Poverty] 
(Shanghai, 1937), 121.
8 li and Wang, op. cit., 129.
9Beiping Municipal Government, Beiping shi, op. cit., 104.
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SoCiAl HiSToRy  17
This enquiry runs somewhat against the grain of existing China scholarship. Most urban 
studies to date suggest a reading of the early twentieth-century Chinese city as a site of 
technological and social experimentation, in which the natural and social sciences, from 
engineering and medicine to law and sociology, were assertively applied, on terms set by 
self-consciously modernizing elites, to the betterment of cities and their people. In this 
context, poor relief was part of a wider, scientifically authorized disciplinary system that 
ran through public institutions across the modernizing cityscape. These studies have mined 
very productively the mass of resources on the reformist projects of officials, businessmen 
and civic activists that were designed to create more rational, efficient and orderly cities, 
to demonstrate China’s development, and to foster loyal and compliant behaviour among 
city people as they channelled emerging notions of citizenship. They thereby reveal 
elite fascination with the urban environment as a testing ground for new approaches to 
infrastructure and construction, economic growth and social development.10
The meticulous documenting of this work by elites has ensured that their voices and 
preoccupations predominate in the archive. While a handful of studies, most notably 
David Strand’s ground-breaking study of Beijing in the 1920s, illuminate the lives of petty 
urbanites, most reveal cities with greatest clarity as they were managed from above.11 This 
scholarship suggests that, as the city became an object of display, it was often imagined also 
as a site of discipline, in which the urban poor appeared as a blemish upon the modernizing 
urban environment. Scholars such as Madeleine Yue Dong and Charles Musgrove have 
highlighted the educative ambitions of China’s city planners.12 Tong Lam’s analysis of the 
mid-century passion for social surveys points to their dual functions of supporting the 
diagnosis of national ills and demonstrating China’s progress towards rational, empirically 
founded governance.13
While a narrowly Foucauldian reading of this literature is undoubtedly an 
oversimplification, its cumulative effect is to underline, far more emphatically than other 
facets of cities’ complex development, the assertive deployment of new forms of knowledge 
in the service of state and social power. In this context, poverty and associated problems were 
constructed in the official mind as deviancy. This complicates – but does not fundamentally 
challenge – established narratives that presented the poor as essentially powerless in the 
face of punitive and exploitative treatment by the authorities, and that gained currency 
in part at least for their political utility after 1949. As Aminda Smith demonstrates, these 
narratives of the dark pre-revolution were central to the legitimation of ‘thought reform’ 
work and the Beijing poor under socialism.14
10J. Esherick (ed.), Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900–1950 (Honolulu, 2000); K. Stapleton, 
Civilizing Chengdu: Chinese Urban Reform, 1895–1937 (cambridge, Ma, 2000); F. M. Wakeman, Jr, Policing Shanghai: 
1927–1937 (Berkeley, 1996).
11 the pioneer here is Sidney Gamble, op. cit.; more recently, see D. Strand, Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in 
the 1920s (Berkeley, 1989); D. Wang, Street Culture in Chengdu: Public Space, Urban Commoners, and Local Politics, 
1870–1930 (Stanford, 2003); H. lu, Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Twentieth Century (Berkeley, 2004); 
Zhao, ‘Down the alleyway’, op. cit.
12M. y. Dong, Republican Beijing: The City and its Histories (Berkeley, 2003) and c. Musgrove, China’s Contested Capital: 
Architecture, Ritual and Response in Nanjing (Honolulu, 2012).
13 t. lam, A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation-state, 1900–1949 (Berkeley, 
2011), esp. 4, 14–18.
14 a. M. Smith, ‘thought reform and the unreformable: re-education centers and the rhetoric of opposition in the early People’s 
republic of china’, Journal of Asian Studies, 72, 4 (2013), 937–58.
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18  M. DRyBuRGH 
Thus the poor did not ‘suffer’ poverty or disease; they were, to borrow Janet Chen’s 
arresting phrase, ‘guilty’ of it.15 This position – adumbrated in the work of Ruth Rogaski 
and Zwia Lipkin – is explored more fully in Chen’s study of poverty and ‘pauperism’.16 
Rogaski analyses the emergence of ‘hygiene’ (weisheng) in the north China port of Tianjin 
as a ‘powerful discourse of Chinese inadequacy and an essential “skill” necessary for joining 
the ranks of the modern’, and argues that it was animated by anxious comparisons between 
China and the powers – European, North American, Japanese – with rights and interests 
in the city. As Rogaski demonstrates the interpenetration of hygienic regulation and the 
social and political hierarchies of the city, she observes that the weight of official scrutiny 
and regulation fell disproportionately on Tianjin’s poorer inhabitants.17 Lipkin highlights 
the role of state modernization in constructing groups among the poor such as beggars, 
rickshaw-pullers and prostitutes as ‘deviants’ and negative social exemplars, but notes also 
important dislocations between notions of poverty and the divisions between, for example, 
the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor.18
Chen points to the conflation of poverty and criminality and the rising use of ‘charitable 
detention’ that dumped the vulnerable poor in the ‘punitive institution’ of the poorhouse.19 
Chen’s analysis is most compelling where it highlights the criminalization of young poor men 
and documents the collision between urban modernizing projects and socially marginalized 
(but none the less organized) groups such as beggars or shanty town-dwellers, but is less 
persuasive where it addresses the cases of women, children and other recipients of welfare. 
She flags, but does not resolve, important contradictions within official understandings 
of poverty and its implications; while showing that the authorities recognized a 
distinction between ‘undeserving’ and (relatively) ‘deserving’ groups of poor people, she 
suggests little variation in the institutional arrangements within which these groups were 
managed.20
As Chen notes, poverty was recognized as a pressing issue in early twentieth-century 
China by traditionally minded and modernizing intellectuals alike. Official responses 
to poverty were enmeshed with shifting understandings of social and state rights and 
obligations, and these were shaped both by extensive borrowing, mostly from Japanese 
and North American sociological thinking on poverty, ‘pauperism’ and ‘social parasitism’, 
in pursuit of national development and self-strengthening, and by the conflict between 
these and ‘Confucian’ state paternalism.21 However, in underlining the ways in which these 
tendencies combined to support punitive approaches to some groups within the poor, and 
by framing these within a language of ‘guilt’, ‘parasitism’, ‘interrogation’ and ‘detention’, 
Chen somewhat obscures both the diverse routes that led Beijing’s poor towards the welfare 
institutes and the ambivalence that continued to mark elite thinking.22
This ambivalence was revealed in works such as sociologist Ke Xiangfeng’s 1937 text On 
Poverty. While Ke warned of the risks that poverty would lead individuals into crime or 
dependency and increase the burden on the state, he identified causes of poverty that were in 
15 chen, op. cit.
16 r. rogaski, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China (Berkeley, 2004); Z. lipkin, Useless to 
the State: ‘Social Problems’ and Social Engineering in Nationalist Nanjing, 1927–1937 (cambridge, Ma, 2006); chen, op. cit.
17 rogaski, op. cit., 167–80.
18 lipkin, op. cit., 7–15.
19 chen, op. cit., 2, 13–14.
20 ibid., 48–9.
21ibid., 3, 16–17, 22, 88.
22 all terms from chen, op. cit., 1–2.
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SoCiAl HiSToRy  19
most cases beyond the control of individual poor families, from the death of a breadwinner 
through inadequate labour rights to famine and civil war. While he noted factors such as 
the costs of family rituals and illiteracy, he treated these as failings of collective practice 
and custom, and not as individual inadequacies.23 Between the anxieties over ‘pauperism’ 
and Ke’s understanding of poverty as socially situated, therefore, we see two potentially 
quite distinct understandings of ‘poverty as social problem’. Was ‘society’ in the abstract 
threatened by the personal failings of the poor? Or were the poor the victims of a wider 
social dysfunction?
In his concluding recommendations on poverty relief, Ke suggested strategies that 
combined the ‘scientific’ and disciplinary with the ‘compassionate’ and paternalistic. Effective 
poor relief must rely on detailed investigations of the poor, be managed by experienced 
staff, transform the minds of the poor through ‘teaching’ and ‘nurturing’ and support 
self-sufficiency without encouraging dependency.24 This ambiguous understanding of poverty 
and the efforts of scholars to distinguish the deserving from the undeserving left ample 
scope for officials to apply punitive policies to ostensibly compassionate ends. Additionally, 
they created opportunities for those among the urban poor who were willing to conform to 
the normative frameworks of welfare institutions to make instrumental use of disciplinary 
systems. By failing to recognize the prevalence of such strategic, transactional behaviour, 
earlier studies have understated the agency of the urban poor in Republican Beijing.
Where the agency of the common city people has been explored, it has typically been 
attributed to larger groups with access to greater economic or social resources than our 
subjects here. Analyses of early labour activism have offered rich insights into political and 
economic hierarchies and into modes of workers’ resistance and organization.25 Studies 
of beggars and prostitutes have highlighted the importance of robust trade networks and 
practices that operated at several removes from official notice and control.26 Other works 
have charted emerging civic engagement, shifting living standards and subaltern consumer 
cultures.27 However, the transactions discussed below, between the local state and the Beijing 
poor over access to the welfare institutes, show us families and individuals who felt their 
economic and social resources were so depleted that recourse to state support offered their 
best hope of survival, yet they remained determined to exercise agency and maintain an 
appearance of autonomy.
De Certeau’s notion of tactics, the ‘arts of the weak’, urges greater attention to the ‘popular 
procedures [that] manipulate the mechanisms of discipline, and conform to them only to 
evade them’, and invites us to consider how the discursive and institutional framework of 
poor relief was received, appropriated and made habitable by the urban poor.28 Recent work 
in development studies on poverty and livelihoods highlights the project of making a living 
as one in which the poor may deploy a range of capabilities, resources and tangible and 
intangible assets in pursuit of family or personal security.29 It thereby offers an understanding 
of poverty that is not limited to official preoccupations, draws our attention to the use of 
23 Ke, op. cit., 1–2, 54–6. Ke was influenced here by the work of american sociologist John l Gillin (1871–1958).
24 Ke, op. cit., 123–4.
25 G. Hershatter, The Workers of Tianjin, 1900–1949 (Stanford, 1986); S. Smith, Like Cattle and Horses: Nationalism and 
Labor in Shanghai, 1895–1927 (Durham, Nc, 2002).
26 G. Hershatter, Dangerous Pleasures: Prostitution and Modernity in Twentieth-century Shanghai (Berkeley, 1997); H. lu, 
Street Criers: A Cultural History of Chinese Beggars (Stanford, 2005).
27 See n. 12 above.
28 M. de certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley, 1984), xiv, xx–xxiv, 45–9.
29 l. de Haan and a. Zoomers, ‘Exploring the frontiers of livelihoods research’, Development and Change, 36, 1 (2005), 27–47.
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20  M. DRyBuRGH 
official support as a livelihood resource, and allows us to consider how the Beijing poor 
understood and represented their poverty as they navigated between official policy and 
uncertain economic conditions.
Poverty and the Beijing welfare institutes
Urban development in China was negotiated through national networks of officials and 
researchers, while remaining subject to local variation in understandings of ‘the city’ and 
city administration. Local government in Beijing was shaped by tensions between past 
and present. Beijing’s history as imperial capital had left a built environment that was 
impressive to look at, expensive to maintain and difficult to adapt to modern economic 
needs. Its present was marked by the loss of political status after 1928, rising unemployment, 
falling consumption, and growing external pressure between the Japanese occupation of 
‘Manchuria’ – the provinces north-east of Beijing – in 1931, and the outbreak of war in 
1937.30
In these years, Beijing’s people suffered entrenched poverty, new disruption to livelihoods 
and downward social mobility. Although a 1932 official survey opened optimistically, boasting 
‘1.4 million consumers, over 30,000 commercial establishments, 14,000 small businessmen, 
700-odd factories, 70,000 workers, 60,000 independent labourers and innumerable family 
workshops…’, comments on Beijing’s decline and demands for its ‘revitalization’ were 
far more common.31 Other studies emphasized local structural economic weaknesses, 
over-reliance on consumption and neglect of manufacturing, leading to a 10 per cent fall 
in the number of tax-registered stores between 1928 and 1931, and to declining turnover 
in surviving businesses.32 Employment in key commercial sectors fell dramatically, by 36 
and 49 per cent in the food and drink and garment guilds respectively, and also affected 
former government workers, whose numbers have been estimated at around 80,000 in the 
mid-1920s.33 By 1933, over 40,000 Beijing households (around 15 per cent of the total, and 
170,000 individuals) were classed as ‘poor’.34 Fewer than half of these households achieved 
the minimum annual income – around 125–140 yuan – required for essential food and 
clothing. As the typical wages of a servant, shoemaker, mason or junior policeman barely 
exceeded this figure, we may assume that many lived on the very margins of survival.35
Poverty alleviation and economic regeneration did not feature prominently in municipal 
government planning before the 1930s and, despite rising poverty and the proliferation 
of welfare facilities, the budget allocations for these activities were dwarfed by those for 
policing, education and public works.36 In 1936, as welfare and regeneration work expanded, 
a recorded 34,000 jin of maize noodles, 100,000 jin of coal and 1600 padded garments were 
30 on local histories, see Dong, op. cit.; on Sino-Japanese tensions, see M. Dryburgh, North China and Japanese Expansion, 
1933–1937 (richmond, 2000).
31 Z. chi, X. lou and W. chen, Beiping shi gongshangye gaikuang [Overview of Commerce and Industry in Beiping] (Beiping, 
1932), 1; the ‘revitalization’ debate is discussed in M. Dryburgh, ‘National city, human city: the reimagining and revitalization 
of Beiping, 1928–37’, Urban History, 32, 3 (2005), 515–17.
32 G. lin, ‘tongji shuzi xia de Beiping’ [‘Beiping in figures and statistics’], Sheke zazhi, 2, 3 (1931), 401, 403.
33 lin, op. cit., 404–5; Strand, op. cit., 297, n. 31.
34 N. Niu, ‘Beiping 1200 pinhu zhi yanjiu’ [‘research on 1200 poor households in Beiping’] (reprinted from Shehui xuejie, 7, June 
1933) in W. li, M. Xia and X. Huang (eds), Minguo shiqi shehui diaocha congbian: dibian shehui juan (Fuzhou, 2005), 697, 702.
35 Niu, op. cit., 735; Gamble, op. cit., 317.
36 Beiping Municipal Government, Minguo 23 niandu yuding xingzheng jihuashu [Administrative Plan, 1934] (Beijing, 
1934). the Social affairs Bureau budget was less than 10 per cent of the policing budget, 20 per cent of the education budget 
and 40 per cent of the public works budget. lin, op. cit., 388, 413.
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SoCiAl HiSToRy  21
distributed to a total of 8400 poor households, and 1.6 million meals were served in soup 
kitchens. To stimulate the economy, loans totalling nearly 360,000 yuan – double the Bureau’s 
annual working budget for the early 1930s – were made to agriculture, manufacture and 
commerce between April 1935 and February 1936.37 The institutes admitted unemployed 
adults of working age and their families, the elderly or infirm, orphans and lost children. 
Some applied for entry, while others were referred by charitable organizations or by the 
police, whose responsibilities extended beyond criminal enforcement into the promotion 
of health and welfare. Turnover of inmates was high, though some, notably children and 
young women, might spend several years in the institutes.38 Many senior welfare institute 
staff were relatively young, and a handful – such as Dong Shuhui, director of the children’s 
division – were women. Many were educated to university or college level in disciplines such 
as law, economics or education, rather than in the pre-1905 Confucianized curriculum, and 
these were relatively well paid, with monthly salaries ranging from sixty to one hundred 
yuan for managers by 1934.39
It is important to distinguish the Beijing institutes from European or North American 
workhouses. Although the image of the nineteenth-century British workhouse was ‘fixed … 
in the popular imagination as a place of unparalleled dread’, any assumption that the Beijing 
institutes of the 1930s were consistently comparably punitive could be challenged on two 
fronts.40 First, a more complex picture of the European institutions is emerging from recent 
scholarship: understandings of European workhouses as ‘total institutions’ are eroded by 
studies that point to inmate resistance and to the periodic rejection of the moral authority 
of the workhouse regime by charitable and civic institutions on whose co-operation the 
state depended.41 Second, while the Beijing institutes’ diverse missions consciously bridged 
disciplinary, preventative and protective functions, the balance between these functions was 
not fixed. Chen has noted that China’s first public ‘workhouses’ were created in the first 
decade of the twentieth century as correctional facilities for petty criminals, addicts and 
vagrants, only later admitting the non-criminal poor on a voluntary basis. Characterizing 
those later admissions to the Beijing institutes also as a form of ‘charitable detention’, she has 
argued that the institutes’ mission conflated welfare and punishment, and in this she echoes 
some contemporary critics of the institutes.42 However, what we can see of the institutes’ 
workings by the 1930s reveals that the terms of that mission might be challenged or used 
creatively by the poor to serve their own ends.
Refuge and rehabilitation: the welfare institutes and the vulnerable poor
Elite ambivalence over poverty and the poor, as articulated above by Ke Xiangfeng, was 
reflected in ambiguities in the welfare institute project, particularly in the treatment of 
vulnerable inmates such as women and children. The epigraph to the municipal Women’s 
37 Beiping Municipal Government, Beiping shi, op. cit., 106, 103. one jin is about 500 grams.
38 Beiping Municipal Government, Beiping shi, op. cit., 104. on the social functions of the city police, see Strand, op. cit., 73–85.
39 Salaries were lower earlier in the decade, and ancillary staff were paid much less: BMa/SaB J002-007-01201, 1932; J002-
001-00129, 1934.
40 F. Driver, Power and Pauperism: The Workhouse System, 1834–1884 (cambridge, 1993), 2.
41 M. van leeuwen, ‘Surviving with a little help: the importance of charity to the poor of amsterdam, 1800–50’, Social History, 
18, 3 (1993), 319–38; anna clark, ‘Wild workhouse girls and the liberal imperial state in mid-nineteenth-century ireland’, 
Journal of Social History, 39, 2 (2005), 389–409; D. Green, ‘Pauper protests: power and resistance in early nineteenth-century 
london workhouses’, Social History, 31, 2 (2006), 137–59.
42 chen, op. cit., 1, 14, 20–2; li and Wang, op. cit., 132.
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22  M. DRyBuRGH 
Welfare Institute’s 1932 handbook emphasized its mission of reforming and rehabilitating 
the poor as it offered them refuge: 
Protect the people’s rights, encourage women’s work
Support the old and weak, relieve poverty
Show kindness to widows and orphans, treat children with virtue
Prohibit prostitution and slavery, rectify public morals.43
That dual mission pervades the text: the main sections of the handbook reflect a preoccupation 
with the creation of good citizens through order, discipline and practical training for 
self-sufficiency, and the appendices record cases in which the institute had exceeded its 
formal obligations to inmates, in securing emergency medical care or escorting women back 
to their native places.44 A woman might enter the institute if she had no family or income, 
wished to leave a ‘mean’ occupation such as prostitution, was enslaved or mistreated, was 
referred by her own family or by the police, or was homeless. Others were to be excluded if 
they were deemed incorrigible, were opium addicts or suffered from a contagious illness. 
Women were released only on receiving a credible offer of marriage, employment, or support 
by family or friends.45
Institute regulations were designed to produce compliant behaviour and well-regulated 
bodies. Supervisory staff were empowered to ‘train, guide, supervise and exhort, and 
punish’ the women where necessary, and penalties for sub-standard work and infractions 
of institute rules varied from oral and written reprimands to restrictions on food for up to 
three days. Mealtimes and bathtimes were regulated as collective activities, and hairstyles 
were to be chosen for ‘cleanliness, not self-expression’. Visiting by family and friends was 
limited to two twenty-minute chaperoned meetings each month.46 Annual celebrations too 
were occasions for formative interventions: the handbook records speeches delivered by 
institute staff and inmates at New Year 1932 on the importance of renouncing self-seeking, 
and finding happiness within poverty.47 There is little to show how effective those regulations 
were in practice: the Beijing institutes spent less time on documenting their internal affairs 
than many of their European counterparts.48 Moreover, while normalizing and protective 
approaches were often closely linked, the balance between the two shifted between cases, 
and while the normalizing aspects of the project were readily accepted by those with fewest 
independent resources beyond the institutes, others were more assertive in exploiting its 
protective dimensions.
The institutes’ treatment of young women highlights the importance attached to fitting 
inmates for conventional roles within conventional family units. Young women admitted 
to the institute as a refuge from domestic abuse or from work in the sex industry were 
expected to receive training for return to the community. Marriage between institute women 
and men from outside was actively promoted. Marriages took place at the rate of two 
to three per month, and this was one of the commonest exit routes for single women.49 
43 Social affairs Bureau, Beiping shi shehuiju funü jiujiyuan gaikuang [Overview of the Beijing Social Affairs Bureau Women’s 
Welfare Institute] (Beijing, 1932), 7.
44 Social affairs Bureau, op. cit., 113–15.
45 BMa/Beijing Municipal Government, J001-002-00013, 1930.
46 Social affairs Bureau, op. cit., 57–68.
47 Social affairs Bureau, op. cit., 104–6.
48 See, for example, Green op. cit.; clark, op. cit.
49 Social affairs Bureau, op. cit., 87–92.
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Marriage arrangements were heavily bureaucratic. Any woman wishing to marry completed 
six months’ training in household affairs, after which her photograph was displayed in a 
designated room in the institute open to men in search of a wife. Once a man had chosen 
a prospective wife from this gallery, the institute authorities carried out checks on his 
background. The final consent of both parties to the marriage was given after a single 
meeting in which they communicated with each other via a member of institute staff.50
Official marriage approvals typically recorded that successful male applicants had a good 
standard of living and appropriate financial guarantors, and were found to be ‘honest and 
sincere’. They offer far more detail and colour on family and financial circumstances than 
on the matter of character, which is typically dealt with in that single, formulaic phrase. 
Files from spring 1935 show that marriages were arranged between women of the institute 
and a mix of widowers and bachelors. Orphan Wang Xiaoduo, aged 19, was chosen by 
policeman Yan Shixun, 32, who earned fourteen yuan per month and lived with his father, 
younger brother and sister-in-law but ‘had no-one to manage the household’. Tailor Bian 
Yuncheng, 32, matched to Zhang Jindi, aged 20, and paper merchant Du Shenglan, 23, 
paired with orphan Zhang Xiufang, 25, had both ‘reached adulthood but never married’. 
Widowers Miao Xiuxin and Wang Hongjian, who both lived with elderly parents but ‘had 
no-one to care for them’, married respectively 22-year-old Zhou Xiaoxi, who had fled her 
home to escape the cruelty of her adoptive mother, and 18-year-old Liu Xiaofeng, whose 
mother was imprisoned after attempting to sell her into prostitution.51
The authorities here acted as matchmakers and as champions of social order as they 
trained women for marriage on terms set by the institute. Leaving aside the economic 
benefits for the city – as marriage transferred the costs of their upkeep from the institutes 
to their families – marriage mattered. Marriage was both a life-cycle event and a substantial 
expense. The inability of families to afford marriages for their children was commonly cited 
as a marker of poverty, and the importance of marriage in reinforcing social networks made 
single status in itself a form of ‘social poverty’. Thus the procedures that assigned women 
to marriages in which their domestic labour was very explicitly exchanged for economic 
security also served a wider bureaucratic vision of social good.
We see few details of the women who entered these marriages, beyond their names and 
ages, a sketch of their circumstances before admission and the procedures attending their 
release, concluding most often with a fingerprint marking their consent on the marriage 
documents. A handful of wedding photographs survive, showing unnamed couples posing 
stiffly for the camera, most dressed in a traditional Chinese gown, often accessorized with a 
fedora for the men and a white, western-style veil for women.52 The frequency with which 
marriages took place suggests that they thought even an unequal marriage preferable to the 
alternatives, and the archive does not reveal whether many women refused specific marriage 
proposals, or the option of marriage as an exit route, or how often the institute authorities 
denied applications for training. At a time when marriages among the urban poor might be 
concluded after the introduction of strangers by acquaintances, and dissolved for pragmatic, 
financial reasons, it is possibly not surprising that these details should have received scant 
50 Social affairs Bureau, op. cit., 51; BMa/SaB, J002-007-01432, 1912–1949.
51 BMa/SaB, J002-007-01290, 1935.
52 Social affairs Bureau, op. cit., 51; BMa/SaB, J002-007-01432, op. cit.; chen, op. cit., 182–4, refers to a larger photographic 
archive, but finds nothing more revealing in the written record.
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24  M. DRyBuRGH 
attention.53 However, the checks made on prospective husbands, the requirement that 
marriages take place within the institute and the formal commitment to support any woman 
abused by her marital family suggest a degree of ongoing official obligation towards those 
women.
Other records, detailing the experiences of women who were married before entry to 
the institutes, highlight the uneasy balance of constraint and protection implied by the 
institutes’ paternalism, and reveal that women were not invariably the passive objects of 
institute procedures. While women with no family or friends beyond the institute might 
appear effectively powerless, women with outside connections might turn these to their 
own advantage, and others might use their understanding of the workings and underlying 
assumptions of the system to exploit limited resources more effectively.
The case of Mrs Yan (née Jin) Yuqing highlights the dependence of many women on 
connections beyond the institutes.54 Mrs Yan was admitted in May 1932, because she had 
lost contact with her husband after he left Beijing to find work. Her entry application was 
sponsored by a Norwegian church in which she had been brought up and through which 
she had been introduced to her husband. In December 1933, missionary Olga Schult applied 
for Mrs Yan’s release, detailing various work opportunities available to her. Although the 
application was approved, Mrs Yan remained in the institute and, in January 1935, Ms Schult 
withdrew her support without explanation. In July 1935, Mrs Yan’s husband, policeman 
Yan Shoukang, applied for her release, explaining that he had sent his wife to the welfare 
institute as he had been unable to support her, hoping that she would receive some education 
or training there, but that now he was financially secure enough to take her back. The 
authorities agreed that she should be allowed to leave.
The experience of Wang Shuxian reveals the ease with which that dependence on external 
support might be exploited.55 Ms Wang fled north-east China in 1931 after the Japanese 
invasion, leaving behind her husband, Li Ruifeng, and entered the Beijing welfare institute in 
1932. When communication between Beijing and the occupied north-east was re-established 
in 1934, Ms Wang contacted her husband and his brother, Li Kuilin, asking them to arrange 
her release. Brother-in-law Kuilin, a member of the Beijing gendarmerie, accordingly 
approached the institute, but husband Ruifeng wrote to the SAB to say that Kuilin was 
not to be trusted with Ms Wang, and that she should stay in the institute. Kuilin retorted 
by forwarding to the SAB a letter in which Ruifeng confessed to remarrying, and berated 
his brother for trying to liberate his first wife, thereby exposing him to embarrassment in 
front of his new in-laws and the possibility of legal action for the second marriage. After 
some deliberation, the authorities concluded that Kuilin, being of good character, should 
be asked to return Wang to her home town ‘to protect her rights’.
At times, the protective mission of the institute became the source of more explicit 
claims by the women housed there. In 1935, Dong Fushan applied for the release of his 
daughter-in-law, Ms Yan. Although his application was accepted, Ms Yan refused to leave, 
stating that she had applied of her own accord for admission because her husband Dong Ji, 
a junior official, had treated her cruelly and taken a former prostitute as a secondary wife. 
53 P. B. Ebrey, ‘introduction’ in r. S. Watson and P. B. Ebrey (eds), Marriage and Inequality in Chinese Society (Stanford, 1991); 
S. l. Glosser, Chinese Visions of Family and State, 1915–1953 (Berkeley, 2003); Zhao, ‘Down the alleyway’, op. cit., 158–61.
54 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00029, 1932–1936. Married women are usually identified in the files only by their husbands’ and 
fathers’ family names (‘Mrs yan [née Jin]’); personal names are often not recorded.
55 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00084, 1935.
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She was afraid to return to him, and would rather stay in the institute to receive training. 
Her request was approved.56
The marriage cases suggest that some women received support only where they accepted 
the institutes’ priorities, moral authority and understanding of their best interests, and other 
cases too show them as largely voiceless. While Mrs Yan’s declaration of her willingness to 
work with the Norwegian church is filed with the original release application, her views 
on her sponsor’s change of heart, on the eighteen further months that she spent in the 
institute, and on her husband’s later intervention are not. Others were denied release for 
more mundane reasons. Telephone operator Wang Zhengguan found himself temporarily 
unable to extract his mother and sister from the institute when the financial guarantor for 
their release application was thought inadequate, and the departure of Mrs Cui, admitted 
in 1935, was delayed while the authorities checked out inconsistencies in the recording of 
her husband’s name.57
Other women, however, used intangible assets, from social networks beyond the institutes 
to understanding of institute principles, in pursuit of their own interests. For some of these 
women, officials appear to have made an effort to weigh up conflicting evidence and consider 
a woman’s future before handing down a decision. The social or economic status of the 
parties involved might be taken into account, but was not always the decisive factor. On the 
one hand, institute recognition of Wang Shuxian’s rights independent of (and in defiance 
of) her husband’s wishes, and the decision to allow her release, were secured only by proxy, 
through the intervention of a brother-in-law who was himself of good standing in the eyes 
of the institute authorities and was able to reveal Li Ruifeng’s ulterior motives. On the other 
hand, Dong Ji’s status as a government employee and his family’s financial security counted 
for less than his wife’s accusations of abuse, and her determination not to return to him.58
The institutes’ handling of cases involving unattached children further underlines 
assumptions of official obligation towards vulnerable citizens. Many of those admitted to 
the institutes were minors, including orphans, abandoned or lost children, and runaways, 
with no known relatives in Beijing. It is often recorded that they were found ‘wandering 
destitute’ – sleeping rough, or begging – before being referred to the institutes, typically by 
the city police. Official handling of these cases appears to have been relatively sympathetic. 
Their education and training followed the standard primary curriculum, and the institutes’ 
roles at times included mediation between conflicting interests and understandings of family 
responsibilities.
In some of the most straightforward cases, the institutes assumed responsibility for young 
people affected by crises such as war, civil disorder or bereavement. By the time Zhang Zhu 
was referred to the SAB in 1934, she had seen her father killed by bandits and her mother 
abducted. She had fled with her older sister from their home in Henan, completing the 
journey of several hundred miles to Beijing alone when her sister died of starvation. On 
reaching Beijing, Zhang supported herself by begging, but was later admitted to hospital 
with a leg injury and thence referred for welfare institute admission by a doctor, who wrote, 
‘She has no friends or family here, and it would be terrible for her to lose her chance of 
56 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00029, op. cit.
57 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00082, 1935; J002-007-01216, 1935. this problem was not uncommon, as adult males frequently 
adopted both a ‘style’ (zi) and a ‘courtesy name’ (hao).
58 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00029, op. cit.
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26  M. DRyBuRGH 
education while so young. If the mission of the welfare institute is to alleviate poverty and 
hardship, surely something can be done…’59
Other children were admitted to the institutes to escape neglect or exploitation by their 
families. Orphan Gao Yi’er was rejected by his uncle after losing his job tending pigs. Yu 
Lianfang was sent to the women’s welfare institute by the municipal courts after her father 
tried to sell her and five other girls to a theatre troupe. Zhu Pengqin was sent by his mother 
to seek an apprenticeship with a Beijing joinery that already employed his uncle, but was 
abandoned after the uncle absconded with all Pengqin’s belongings and apprenticeship 
fee. Feng Bingguang’s adoptive father refused to reclaim him from the police, declaring 
that the boy, then aged twelve, had repeatedly stolen money from home, and deserved to 
be detained. When ten-year-old barber’s apprentice Liang Shunyi lost both his parents, his 
relatives seized control of the house and farmland he had inherited, took him to Beijing 
and left him there, threatening to kill him if he ever returned home.60
Material and economic conflicts predominate in these stories, to the extent that when 
one child, Ma Xiaodai, told the authorities that his widowed father and new stepmother had 
abandoned him because they ‘did not love him’, it appears as something of an anomaly.61 More 
commonly, the orphans and wayward children referred to the institutes had been resented 
as burdens or as competitors for limited family resources, or treated, like Yu Lianfang, as 
commodities or sources of income. It was expected that the children of poorer families 
would be economically active. Gamble noted apprenticeship as a common experience for 
the young in his survey group, particularly for boys, and also pointed to the role of invisible 
labour, for example, in scavenging for fuel by younger children.62 Yet the reliance of families 
on the labour of the young created potential conflicts of interest, even where this was framed 
within legal arrangements. Guo Xiaoyang and Wang Wengui were admitted after walking 
out of apprenticeships where they were beaten. Wang, aged thirteen, told the police that he 
was afraid to go home in case his mother – a widow with other children – sent him back 
to his former employer.63 While Yu Lianfang’s case appears as a classic illustration of the 
abuses associated with the commodification of family members – particularly women and 
children – Wang Wengui’s predicament alerts us to a subtler form of the same problem.
Generally, the authorities recorded efforts to trace relatives or to pursue alleged crimes. 
While they had some success in restoring lost children to their families, they frequently drew 
a blank in criminal cases: investigations located neither the joinery where Zhu Pengqin had 
sought apprenticeship nor his original home, and although Liang Shunyi was able to supply 
the names of his relatives and home village, and details of the disputed land, local officials 
denied all knowledge of the family and the case. However, this did not visibly affect officials’ 
assumption that they had formal obligations in such cases, and even children who had run 
away from home over apparently minor quarrels, children who had strayed carelessly and 
become lost or children whose stories could not be verified in any detail were admitted, 
at least temporarily. Nor did the authorities readily release minors, even where they had 
friends or relatives willing to take responsibility for them. Orphan Zhang Dalu was admitted 
with his brother and sister through the efforts of colleagues of his late grandfather, a bank 
59 BMa/SaB, J002-007-01231, 1934–1935. the file does not specify to which institute Zhang was sent.
60 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00043, 1933–1936; J002-006-00053, 1934; J002-007-01245, 1934.
61 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00043, op. cit.
62 Gamble, op. cit., 20, 220.
63 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00043, op. cit.; J002-007-01427, 1934–1936.
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employee. Two years later, when an aunt was located in Nanjing who was willing to take 
the children in and educate them, the authorities delayed their release while cross-checks 
were made on the aunt’s background and the personal details of the children’s sponsors.64
More often than not, inmates and their families complied readily with official directives: 
official support, after all, might often be preferable to sleeping on the streets or returning 
to an abusive family. Yet even among the families of highly marginalized groups, such as 
beggars and opium addicts, some tempered their compliance with requests for leniency, or 
with assertions that family needs should outweigh official prohibitions of begging, while 
others more openly resisted official judgements and labels. As well as underlining the agency 
of poor urban families, these cases also point to the variations within these categories: not 
all ‘beggars’ were homeless, or vagrant, and not all opium addicts were as useless to their 
own families as they appeared to the state.
For example, when the son-in-law of elderly Mrs Guo – referred to the welfare institute 
for begging – applied for her release, he appealed for compassion, declaring that she was 
old, ill and hungry, and ‘had not understood that this was against the law’. He undertook 
to manage her behaviour so that she would not re–offend.65 Nor did nineteen-year-old 
Zhang Diangui deny that his aunt had been begging, but he implored the authorities to 
release her to take care of his sick brother, who ‘cannot eat because of his illness, but weeps 
all day’. Zhu Fuliang, applying for the release of his son Zhu Fengming – admitted as an 
opium user – undertook to supervise his son and find farm work for him, but also insisted 
that his family needed Fengming: ‘I lost my parents as a child, and my wife when I was in 
my prime. I have only one son, and we depended on each other as life itself … after he left 
for Beijing we heard nothing. His wife weeps all day, and I am bedridden and cannot work, 
so we cannot survive without him.’66 Ma Yuting’s wife alleged that the police had mistaken 
him for a beggar as his clothes were tattered, and the release order appears to acknowledge 
this as an error. The same misunderstanding caught up the 78-year-old Mrs Qing, who was 
found ‘apparently begging’ in dirty clothes.67
These responses point to the mix of interests at stake: was family dignity better defended 
by policing one’s own relatives, or by challenging official accusations against them? And 
which approach was more likely to secure a relative’s release? Was the alleged beggar or 
addict a burden on the family, or a source of domestic support? Was compliance with official 
prohibition of begging or narcotics use an obligation, or was it an observance to be traded 
in the service of a family’s practical and affective needs?
Thus official support – with its associated constraints – was readily accepted by those 
with fewest alternative resources: by orphans, refugees or young women who could not 
rely on their own families for support or protection. While there were surely solid practical 
reasons for compliance in these most vulnerable groups, their apparent conformity is also a 
product of official recording (or non-recording) procedures that solicited inmate testimony 
only at specific times and in specific forms. Others, however, were more assertive, or had 
resources outside the institute, and it is striking that, where their voices were heard, they 
were often animated by a lively sense of personal interest as inmates and their families judged 
and commented on the welfare institute project and measured it against their own needs.
64 BMa/SaB, J002-007-01196, 1932–1934.
65 BMa/SaB, J002-007-01310, 1936.
66 BMa/SaB, J002-007-01216, op. cit.; J002-007-01286, op. cit.
67 BMa/SaB, J002-007-01286, op. cit.
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‘It would be a truly virtuous act’: the welfare institutes as livelihood resource
If we shift our attention from referrals to applications, the balance within the transactions 
between local state and the urban poor also shifts. While the normalizing project of the 
institutes remains visible, it becomes even clearer that applicants were determined to turn 
that project and its underlying assumptions to their own ends. Recourse to the welfare 
institute became a livelihood tactic, a claim on the authorities in pursuit of which certain 
sub-groups within the poor mobilized intangible assets, from the social networks that 
supplied references and guarantors to their understanding of the terms on which a successful 
application might be made. While de Certeau has pointed to the ‘joyful dexterity’ inherent 
in such tactics where they are deployed to foil a constraining system, the concern of our 
subjects here was not to subvert or evade the system, but to appropriate it, and to use its 
very solidity as a source of support.68
Many such applications came from adults – most often from mothers or from widowed 
fathers – seeking admission for young children or for whole families; a sizeable minority 
came from adults as individuals. These applicants were not destitute: many had a fixed 
address (as noted above, even those admitted for begging might have families in more stable 
circumstances), some limited income and a place in some social network. For these people, 
recourse to the welfare institute did not represent a simple failure in livelihood. Instead, the 
institutes were used purposefully to supplement normal livelihood resources and claims 
where these proved inadequate. Their applications appear designed to highlight both their 
exposure to common economic and political shocks and trends, and their resourcefulness 
in the business of making a living as a qualification for access to official support.
Application procedures involved some financial outlay, and made demands on intangible 
resources such as social networks. The SAB archives contain relatively few unsuccessful 
applications, and it is hard to tell how many were rejected, or how many possible applicants 
were deterred by the costs and procedures involved. Applications were submitted on paper, 
and applicants unable to write for themselves might have had to pay to have them written 
by someone else on appropriate terms. Application forms had to be paid for, at ten cents 
for the first hundred characters and one cent for a guarantor’s form (this for a family that 
might be living on fifty cents a day). A more substantial hurdle was that applicants also 
needed a guarantor: a proprietor of a reputable, tax-assessed business who could affirm that 
the application was made in good faith, and offer compensation if the applicant failed to 
comply with regulations. The role of officials appears somewhat ambiguous here. While the 
city police acted as gatekeepers, making home visits to verify applicants’ claims of poverty 
and their guarantors’ credentials, Chen notes that SAB clerks served as scribes for some 
applications, acting also as mediators or facilitators between applicants and government.69
This restricted voluntary admission to the institutes to those who were willing to accept 
the procedural discipline involved, and who could call on a taxpayer to vouch for them. 
The cases noted above of Mrs Yan (née Jin) Yuqing, and Wang Zhengguan’s mother and 
sister suggest that anyone whose connections lapsed during their time in the institute would 
have found it difficult to get out. Thus voluntary entrants (unlike the beggars and addicts 
who were forcibly admitted) typically came from families that lived on the edge of social 
68 de certeau, op. cit., 18.
69 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00079, 1935–1936; BMa/Beijing Municipal Government, J001-002-00013, op. cit.; chen, op. cit., 105. 
the forms do not specify whether these fees covered the work of writing.
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or economic security, but who were much further from the margins of absolute survival 
than Beijing’s very poorest families. These families were of far lower status than the genteel 
‘shame-faced poor’ who received discreet charity in the nineteenth-century Netherlands.70 
Yet their treatment by the authorities reflected a similar assumption: that there were some 
whose past status entitled them to official support. Their efforts underlined the distinction 
between the struggling and the destitute. Consciousness of that distinction informed many 
applications, and applicants worked to appear deserving – a good investment for the city 
government, so to speak – as well as desperate.
The majority of applicants embedded their account of personal crisis in a narrative that 
covered – sometimes minimally, sometimes in great detail – not only the straits to which 
poverty had reduced them, but also those episodes that showed them to be resourceful, 
industrious and therefore worthy of support. They evoked years of hardship weathered 
and efforts to secure a sustainable living before resorting to welfare. Applicants detailed 
their reliance on family and friends, their willingness to move to find work or sell family 
possessions to remain afloat, emphasizing that their difficulties were the product of forces 
beyond their control, of regional economic decline, or of external pressures such as civil 
and other wars that had disrupted their access to personal networks and resources.71 Some 
petitioners vividly described their poverty, writing of cold, of their inability to provide one 
good meal a day for their children, of their fear of starvation, of families sitting weeping 
at their plight. When Mrs Wang (née Liu) applied for admission with her two children, 
she declared, ‘My husband is away and we cannot contact him. My children are young, 
life is hard, and we are cold and hungry. If you would do us this great kindness, it would 
save us from certain death.’ The police report on Mrs Wang’s case stated that the family 
was ‘in a most pitiful state’, and reports routinely confirmed that applicants were indeed as 
poverty-stricken (literally, ‘poor and cold’) as they claimed.72
However, poverty was complicated. Having a job or business was in itself no guarantee of 
an adequate living, and the decision to apply to the welfare institutes did not always mean 
that a family had reached the end of the line. Applications addressed a mix of economic and 
welfare concerns, aiming to build future resilience as well as remedying present crises. It 
might be more precise to suggest that, for some, the exploitation of welfare offered hope of 
evading destitution, rather than escaping it, and that it might make the difference between 
security and insecurity, rather than between life and death.
Many families, for example, sought institute places only for their middle children. These 
were old enough to cope with the austere institute regime, but too young to contribute much 
to family income. Their admission relieved pressure on family resources while leaving open 
the option of their return once the family’s economic position was more stable. Thus Zhang 
Jing’an applied for admission for his nephew, whose father ran a small vegetable business 
but was unable to support his family of four. Li Fengqi’s market stall did not make enough 
to feed his wife and five sons, so he sent the second and third boys to the institute.73 After 
Mrs Song (née Gao) lost her butcher’s business, she asked the welfare institutes to take her 
sons, aged six and eleven, but not herself. Mrs Yan (née Song)’s husband was a small trader 
70 van leeuwen, op. cit., 329–30.
71 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00079, op. cit.
72 Quotation from BMa/SaB, J002-007-01427, op. cit.; also J002-006-00079, op. cit.
73 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00079, op. cit.
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whose business failed. He left Beijing to try his luck elsewhere, and Mrs Yan applied to 
have three of her five daughters taken in, keeping her oldest and youngest girls at home.74
In many cases, families specifically asked that their children receive education or training 
which they were unable to provide. Widower Meng Xiahe, who fled Japanese-occupied 
north-east China in 1931, applied for admission after failing to find work for himself or an 
apprenticeship for his son in Beijing. Forty-year-old former official You Shangjun asked that 
his sons, aged eight and ten, be taken in for schooling. Li Tuyi, a joiner, sought a place in the 
training factory for his eight-year-old son – business was slack and the family of five ‘could 
not afford one square meal a day’, even though his wife took in washing. Mr Li, a farmer, 
asked for training for his eleven-year-old son: ‘He is eager to learn a trade, but we don’t 
have the means to support him in this…’ Mr Li was careful to frame this modest ambition 
within a desire to serve public interests, continuing ‘...we would be most grateful, and this 
might do something to remedy our nation’s problems’, but the longer-term implications for 
family economic security were equally striking.75
Petitions from former officials underlined the impact of economic instability on groups 
that had once been relatively secure. Fei Jiandong was a Ministry of Transport clerk until 
1928 when the Beijing government was dissolved and he lost his job. In 1934, unable to 
support his three sons, he asked to have them admitted to the welfare institute.76 An Dingxin 
had the same experience, finding temporary security in the Changlu Salt Bureau, until 
Japanese intervention in the salt administration forced a reorganization and cost him that 
post too. In 1936, aged thirty-seven, tired of wandering the streets and unable to afford even 
one square meal a day, he applied to enter the institute to work and to ‘avoid starvation’.77 
Shen Delin, aged twenty-nine, was a government clerk with a monthly salary of over ten 
yuan, which he thought adequate for his family’s needs until he too lost his job. His wife and 
child fell ill and died, and he asked to enter the institute for shelter and to learn new skills.78 
These men might once have found work as teachers – a traditional secondary occupation 
for ex-officials – but competition in these alternatives was becoming more intense. Gao 
Jinghan, an experienced teacher aged fifty-five, applied for admission to the institute in 
1936. He had lost one job, lacked the formal qualifications that schools now demanded, 
and was unable to find another.79
Those who had been lower-level public employees appeared more anxious to show 
themselves as deserving. When Gao Yufeng applied for admission he emphasized that, 
despite his poor background, he had managed to secure both an education and a police 
job – respectable work, though not well paid. When he found himself unemployed, he made 
a living performing 'cross-talk' comedic dialogue, a popular genre, but a not prestigious 
one. Only when he fell ill and lost the use of his hands and feet did he appeal to the SAB for 
support.80 Another ex-policeman and graduate of Fengtian Police College, Wang Fuguang, 
filled two closely written pages detailing his efforts to support himself, selling goods of his 
own production across China, after losing his police job.81 These applications emphasized 
74 BMa/SaB, J002-007-01427, op. cit.
75 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00079, op. cit.; J002-007-01245, op. cit.
76 BMa/SaB, J002-007-01231, op. cit.
77 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00085, 1936.
78 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00079, op. cit.
79 Strand, op. cit., 297; lin, op. cit., 393; BMa/SaB, J002-006-00079, op. cit.
80 Strand, op. cit., 77–9; BMa/SaB, J002-007-01310, op. cit.; J002-006-00101, 1936.
81 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00085, op. cit.
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the gulf between past and future prospects. Employment histories were cited as a marker of 
entitlement, rather than as evidence that applicants should continue to fend for themselves. 
Evidence of past self-sufficiency was translated into a claim for admission to the institutes, 
and treated less as a disciplinary imposition than as a qualification for official support.
While many petitions speak most directly of men’s contributions to family income, 
women’s work mattered too, and women worked purposefully to exploit the opportunities 
offered by official support. Mrs Zhang (née Zhang) came to Beijing to find work; when she 
asked to have her two sons, aged eight and eleven, admitted to the welfare institute, she had 
had no news of her soldier husband for three years and had given up hope of supporting her 
three children and mother-in-law on her own wages of three yuan per month.82 In August 
1934, Mrs Fu (née Cao) asked for a place for her daughter so that she could leave Beijing 
to look for a job elsewhere; her unemployed husband had already gone to Tianjin to find 
work. This was one of a number of applications made by working mothers, their relatives 
or – occasionally – their employers, for the care of children.83 Mrs Fu’s application was not a 
declaration that she was unable to make a living, nor does she appear as the passive recipient 
of official handouts or official control. This was rather a deliberate move to release her own 
earning power by delegating care of her daughter to the authorities.
Conclusions
At first sight, the archives of the SAB underline the diversity of the ‘urban poor’ in 1930s 
Beijing, the ease with which city residents might move from apparently secure and 
respectable occupations to poverty and – in some cases – back again, and the importance 
of women and children’s work to family economic security. They suggest the changes to 
employment patterns produced by modernization in China’s cities, and rising vulnerability 
for those who had relatively recently been more secure. As new opportunities were created 
with the introduction of, for example, telephone systems, traditional avenues were closed off 
as schools began to demand formal modern qualifications, rendering experienced teachers 
of working age unemployable. They emphasize, too, that the problem of livelihood in Beijing 
was pressing, and that high political change — the loss of capital status, or the Japanese 
occupation of Manchuria – brought new challenges to livelihood.
Second, correspondence between the authorities and the people highlights the 
impossibility of reducing livelihood to income, and the variations in what was experienced 
as intolerable poverty. Shen Delin, his wife and child got by on ten yuan per month; Wang 
Zhengguan felt unable to support his mother and sister on eight yuan; Mrs Zhang survived 
with her mother-in-law and three children for some time on three yuan. On the one hand, 
understandings of a ‘decent income’ in the present might be complicated by future financial, 
social and personal expectations, from Wang Zhengguan’s filial obligations and actual or 
expected life-cycle costs such as funerals and weddings, through unpredictable charges such 
as medical bills, to Mrs Zhang’s fading hopes of support from her husband. On the other 
hand, we see cases in which individuals had rejected the possibility of relative economic 
security because it was not accompanied by a credible expectation of respect, such as Wang 
Wengui, who refused to continue an apprenticeship where he was mistreated, and the 
82 BMa/SaB, J002-006-00079, op. cit.
83 BMa/SaB, J002-007-01427, op. cit.; also J002-007-01216, op. cit.; J002-007-01231, op. cit.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
oy
al 
Ha
lla
ms
hir
e H
os
pit
al]
 at
 08
:50
 04
 Ju
ly 
20
16
 
32  M. DRyBuRGH 
daughter-in-law of Dong Fushan, who refused to return to an abusive husband. Here, the 
welfare institutes offered social as well as material support.
Third, the archive invites us to consider poverty as a genuinely social problem, not 
simply in that it occurred ‘in society’ and stood between officials and their understandings 
of an ideal social order, but also in that it was shaped in part at least by diverse social 
expectations, experienced as social impairment or exclusion, and might be (for the more 
fortunate) masked or mitigated by social resources. For the urban poor, as we see them in 
the archive, poverty meant shame, disappointment and anxiety as well as hunger and cold, 
and this social understanding of poverty was an accepted strand in the dialogue between 
the poor and the local state. While this was undoubtedly a formulaic dialogue, its formulae 
were more complex than can easily be accommodated within a simple binary of guilt or 
deviance on the one hand, and control or charitable incarceration on the other. While it 
would be an overstatement to suggest that the dialogue was governed by shared notions 
of social contract between government and people, correspondence on entry to and exit 
from the welfare institutes none the less reflects understandings on both sides of obligation 
and entitlement. The correspondence between families applying for access to the welfare 
institutes cannot show us definitively how far the poor had embraced the normative basis 
of welfare. However, it does suggest that they recognized formal observance of those norms 
as a necessary part of the transaction.
The welfare institutes operated within a web of social relations that extended beyond 
the immediate negotiations over access to support. Application procedures required that 
individuals deploy a range of intangible resources in order to qualify for admission to the 
welfare institutes, ranging from understanding of the ‘proper’ terms on which application 
might be made (in the display of resilience, flexibility and the will to self-sufficiency), to 
the mobilization of appropriate connections who could act as guarantors. This produced a 
dynamic of inclusion and exclusion – or a form of triage – among the urban poor, managed 
by the officials who pronounced on admissions to the institutes.
Underlying those processes of qualification and triage, however, was an assumption that 
the authorities were obliged to provide support to those who proved themselves deserving. 
The references to the ‘virtue’ and ‘generosity’ that would be shown in approving an admission 
application appear deferential but, in evoking traditional images of benevolent, paternalistic 
officialdom, they set a moral standard against which bureaucratic decisions would be 
measured. They therefore stood both as declarations that the applicant stood on the right 
side of the lines of inclusion and as assertions of moral community between petitioner and 
bureaucrat. It is striking that, while many petitioners were craftsmen, farmers or servants, 
others had much more in common – in social, educational and occupational terms – with 
the officials to whom they appealed for relief.
Thus the archive reveals the Beijing poor as purposeful and instrumental in their pursuit 
of welfare, working to understand – and to represent to officials – their own poverty on terms 
that would qualify them for support. The welfare institutes became a potential resource, 
relieving families of the burden of feeding younger children, and training those children 
to be more productive as they sheltered them. Beyond their practical functions, they also 
offered opportunities for the maintenance or restoration of individual and family status and 
dignity. Those concerns for dignity mark the self-presentation of applicants, in some cases as 
they assured the authorities that they were worthy recipients of official support, in others – as 
we see with the families of those admitted for begging or narcotics use – as they accepted 
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or resisted the labels applied to relatives by the police and city authorities. Returning to de 
Certeau’s suggestion that the ‘consumer’ conforms to disciplinary procedures in order to 
evade them, we may propose that the Beijing poor who sought welfare were more ambitious 
than those ‘consumers’, despite their greater vulnerability, in that they conformed to local 
state discipline in order to benefit from it.
A study of the welfare institutes therefore reveals not only the fragility of livelihood but 
also the creative deployment by some poor families in Beijing of all possible resources in 
the quest for greater security. The framing of admission applications and the apparently 
quite instrumental expectations of some applicants suggests that, where new paths towards 
a more secure livelihood were perceived to exist, they were used assertively by those in 
need, and that – for sub-groups within the poor at least – welfare institutions were more 
than just a port of last resort. Admission applications reveal a tentative negotiation between 
families and the local state, and complex relations between power, agency, and access to 
material and social support.
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